Potential for Below Baseline REGOs

Two silhouetted figures stand on a platform at sea, observing a vast offshore wind farm against a dramatic sunset sky.

LGCs are now in an interesting position. With the REGO scheme all but fully legislated to start in 2025, there may be opportunity to meet voluntary requirements from this secondary market before it becomes the likely primary market at the end of 2030 until 2050.

The REGO scheme looks likely to exist in parallel to the LGC scheme until the expiry of the RET, with generators able to decide which products they would like to produce in any given period.

However, the REGO scheme will open previously un-tapped generation, such as below baseline generation, generation from outside of the Australian economic waters area and exported generation i.e. Sun Cable, which the LGC cannot. Further (although unlikely before 2030), STCs can be pooled to create 1 MWh, i.e. 1 REGO certificate at the point the 1MWh limit is reached.

This market is currently untapped, but with a REGO holding the same credentials as an LGC, the voluntary surrender optionality (RET Liability must still be met with LGCs until 2030) can be achieved through the REGO scheme.

With voluntary surrenders increasing, the CER estimated in 2022 a total of 7.4million LGCs were surrendered voluntarily. This increased the demand for LGCs by 1.6million in comparison to 2021 and created a demand 23% above the legislated requirements for LGCs (33m).

Prior to a REGO scheme, the increasing demand for these LGCs has come from growing corporate targets either directly into the LGC market or through its secondary market, such as GreenPower schemes.

Without increasing the availability of alternative generation sources, this growth could lead to a tightening of the supply-demand balance of the LGC and an increase in price. As such the introduction of a REGO from 2025 could be the pressure release valve the industry requires.

The growing non-RET requirements are significant, and therefore, the introduction of secondary sources of power through the REGO scheme is the only way the market will be able to meet the increasing demand.

The ACCC investigation into Momentum in 2016, where Momentum was handed a $54,000 fine for falsely advertising their green credentials, as they are backed by Hydro Tas whose generation was below baseline, has brought to the fore the requirement for accreditation of these below baseline assets (outside of the i-REC scheme).

Below baseline is renewable generation assets created before 1997 – mainly hydro assets. The baseline is set on production between 1994 – 1996, and therefore, generators coming on from 1997 have a baseline of zero and can produce LGCs, unlike those online prior to 1997. Indications are these facilities generate 12-13TWh of electricity each, that is, 12-13 million REGOs, which could come into the Australian voluntary market (pre-2030 RET end). However, the below baseline generation is eligible for an i-REC certification and many assets pursued this option prior to the REGO /GO scheme announcements. As such, this 12-13 million may be as low as 2 million in the initial years, given existing PPAs and voluntary i-REC surrender deals in place.

It is worth noting, if Hydro Tas had created the REGO and these were surrendered against the Momentum portfolio, the renewable claim would have been upheld, and the REGO would have never hit the market. This example shows that even if produced, companies may utilise the additional certification without giving others the opportunity to trade them in the open market.

A concern does sit around the inclusion of small-scale renewable REGOs, although unlikely to be in large quantities prior to 2030, the concern holds that the measurement of the “hour” the REGO is produced, when the cumulative units have reached 1MWh of generation, is currently untested and there are a significantly larger number of these units than there are utility scale solar. The cost and oversight required could add cost to the certificate, which we currently have no view of as to the uptake or requirements.

AEMO’s Draft 2024 Integrated System Plan

Electricity substation at sunrise, representing the transition in Australia's National Electricity Market as per AEMO's 2024 ISP.

AEMO recently released its Draft 2024 Integrated System Plan (ISP), which serves as a roadmap for the energy transition in the National Electricity Market (NEM) over the next 20-plus years in line with government policies aimed at achieving net zero by the year 2050.

The plan outlines a cost-effective strategy for essential energy infrastructure to meet consumer needs, ensure reliability and affordability, and achieve net zero. AEMO highlights the urgency for action as the NEM shifts from coal-fired generation dependency. With the closure of coal-fired power stations, the draft proposes using renewable energy supported by storage and gas as the most economical solution for Australia’s energy transition.

The policy set by the Federal Government aims for a 43% reduction in emissions compared to 2005 levels by the year 2030. Additionally, the policy targets 82% of electricity supplied in the NEM to come from renewable sources.

Previous ISPs established ambitious trajectories for investment, and it is imperative that projects are now executed according to the plans. AEMO’s most probable future scenario predicts about 90% of NEM’s coal fleet will retire before 2025, and the entire fleet will retire before 2040.

The energy transition is already well underway, with coal retiring faster than initially announced. The ISP continues to stress the need for urgent investments in generation, firming, and transmission to maintain a secure, reliable, and affordable electricity supply. The retirement of coal-fired generators necessitates a transition to low-cost renewable energy, supported by firming technologies like storage and gas-powered generation.

AEMO has stated that the NEM must almost triple its capacity to supply energy by 2050 to replace retiring coal capacity and meet increasing electricity demand. Every government within the NEM is actively endorsing the transition. The Federal Government has broadened the Capacity Investment Scheme, while various states have their initiatives supporting the transition to net zero.

The 2024 ISP outlined three future scenarios for 2050, which included Step Change, Progressive Change, and Green Energy Exports. All these scenarios involve the retirement of coal, aligning with government net-zero commitments. AEMO has assigned likelihoods of 43% for Step Change, 42% for Progressive Change, and 15% for Green Energy Exports.

Under AEMO’s optimal development path (ODP) for the Step Change scenario, there is a call for investment that would triple grid-scale variable renewable energy by 2030 and increase it sevenfold by 2050. The plan emphasises grid-scale generation within Renewable Energy Zones, quadrupling firming capacity, supporting a four-fold increase in rooftop solar capacity, and leveraging system security services to ensure reliability.

In terms of transmission, nearly 10,000 km of transmission is needed by 2050 for the Step Change and Progressive Change scenarios, with over twice that to support the Green Energy Exports scenario. The annualised capital cost for all infrastructure in the ODP until 2050 is $121 billion, with transmission projects constituting 13.5% of the annualised cost.

The NEM faces several risks in transitioning from coal to renewable energy. Key challenges that AEMO has identified include uncertainty in infrastructure investment, early coal retirements, markets and power system operations that are not yet ready for 100% renewables. Additionally, consumer energy resources are not adequately integrated into grid operations, the social license for the energy transition is not being earned, and critical energy assets and skilled workforces are not being secured.

In summary, AEMO’s Draft 2024 Integrated System Plan charts a crucial path for Australia’s energy transition, aligning with net-zero goals. With an urgent focus on retiring coal-fired stations, the plan advocates a swift move to renewables backed by storage and gas solutions. The plan also outlines the significant challenges faced by the industry that are required to be overcome in order to reach net zero by 2050 while ensuring a reliable and affordable energy supply.

Queensland’s SuperGrid Infrastructure Blueprint: A Bold Vision or a Tall Order?

Engineers in safety vests and helmets discussing renewable energy solutions on a laptop at a wind turbine electricity plant during twilight

In September 2022, the Queensland government unveiled its SuperGrid Infrastructure Blueprint, a comprehensive plan aimed at transforming the state’s energy landscape. With ambitious targets of achieving 70% renewable energy by 2032 and 80% by 2035, the blueprint sets out to revolutionise the state’s historically coal-dependent energy sector. But, as the initial excitement subsides, concerns regarding feasibility and practicality have begun to surface.

At the heart of the blueprint are six Renewable Energy Zones (REZs), designed to harness the state’s abundant wind and solar resources. These zones have been hailed as the cornerstone of Queensland’s renewable energy future, yet the involvement of various stakeholders, including First Nations people and local farmers, introduces complexities that may impede progress.

One of the primary concerns surrounding the blueprint is the intermittency of renewable energy sources. To address this issue, the plan proposes a significant investment in long-duration storage, complemented by an additional 3 GW of grid-scale storage. However, questions linger regarding the sufficiency of these measures to ensure a stable power supply during periods of high demand. With further delays to Snowy 2.0, the optimism of pumped hydro projects being completed on time has plummeted.

Furthermore, while the blueprint mentions low to zero emission gas-fired generation, the vagueness surrounding the term “low to zero” raises doubts about the commitment to truly reducing emissions. This ambiguity could undermine public trust in the project and create uncertainty for investors.

Another point of contention is Queensland’s continued reliance on its connection with New South Wales. Although this relationship provides a safety net, it also suggests a possible lack of confidence in the state’s independent capability to meet its energy needs.

Powerlink, the entity responsible for facilitating community engagement, faces the daunting task of balancing diverse interests and opinions. While the blueprint’s emphasis on collaboration is laudable, experienced observers may view this approach as a potential hindrance to timely decision-making.

Despite reservations, the SuperGrid Infrastructure Blueprint offers numerous opportunities for innovation and growth, particularly for those familiar with navigating regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the challenges ahead cannot be ignored. Bureaucratic obstacles, coupled with the weight of expectation placed upon Renewable Energy Zones, leaves room for doubt regarding Queensland’s ability to deliver on its promises.

In conclusion, the SuperGrid Infrastructure Blueprint represents a bold vision for Queensland’s energy future, but its success hangs in the balance. Either the state will emerge as a leader in the global transition to renewables, or it will serve as a cautionary tale of overambition. Only time will tell if Queensland has taken a confident step forward or a tentative shuffle into the unknown.